University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2013

The S&P Litigation and Access to Federal Court: A
Case Study in the Limits of Our Removal Model
Gil Seinfeld
University of Michigan Law School, gsein@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/626

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Litigation Commons
Recommended Citation
Seinfeld, Gil. "The S&P Litigation and Access to Federal Court: A Case Study in the Limits of Our Removal Model." Colum. L. Rev.
Sidebar 113 (2013): 123-35.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
SIDEBAR

VOL. 113

SEPTMEMBER 23, 2013

PAGES 123-135

THE S&P LITIGATION AND ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURT: A
CASE STUDY IN THE LIMITS OF OUR REMOVAL MODEL
Gil Seinfeld*
INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2013, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (the MDL panel) ordered the consolidation of fifteen actions filed by
state attorneys general (AGs) against the Standard & Poor’s rating agency
(S&P) for its role in the collapse of the market for structured finance
securities.1 The cases are important: The underlying events shook markets
worldwide and contributed to a global recession, the legal actions themselves
take aim at foundational aspects of the way rating agencies go about their
business, and the suits threaten the imposition of significant fines and penalties
against S&P. So it is unsurprising that the order of the MDL panel—typically
the sort of thing that would fly well under the radar—garnered an
extraordinary measure of media attention.
Many observers marked the consolidation order as a significant victory
for S&P. The Wall Street Journal, for example, characterized the decision as
an “incremental but important legal victory” for the defendants and
emphasized that consolidation will permit S&P “to streamline costs and avoid
a piecemeal legal battle in state courts across the country.”2 Another observer
deemed the decision a “big win” for S&P and highlighted the fact that it
enabled S&P to move the suits away from the AGs’ home courts and onto

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Nick Bagley for
commenting on a draft and to Kate Gilbert for stellar research assistance.
1. Transfer Order, In re Standard & Poor’s Rating Agency Litig., MDL No. 2446, 2013 WL
2445043 (J.P.M.L. June 6, 2013). In all, seventeen suits were consolidated. Two are declaratory
judgment actions filed in federal court by S&P against the states of South Carolina and
Tennessee. The rest are the sovereign enforcement actions mentioned above. There are, in fact,
two named defendants in all of the enforcement actions and two plaintiffs in the declaratory
judgment suits. The McGraw-Hill Companies, S&P’s corporate parent, is named alongside S&P.
2. Jeannette Neumann, S&P Scores a Legal Win, Wall St. J. (June 6, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324798904578529400470610398.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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(arguably) more neutral terrain.3 But the reality is that S&P has won no more
than a lottery ticket. It will enjoy the efficiencies associated with consolidation
and keep the state AGs off of their home turf only if the judge to whom the
cases have been assigned seriously misapplies federal jurisdictional law.
This Essay has two principal goals. The first is to show that our
jurisdictional law does not permit removal in these cases. S&P has argued that
these lawsuits are eligible for federal court jurisdiction on a federal question
theory—i.e., on the ground that they “arise under” federal law within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. I will show in Part I that these arguments are
strained and ultimately unavailing.
My second goal (pursued in Part II) is to show that the relevant
jurisdictional law is seriously unsatisfying. The S&P litigation raises
challenging questions of jurisdictional policy, but the law as it stands simply
fails to engage them. It relies instead on a pair of mechanical rules for sorting
cases between the state and federal courts that have only an attenuated
relationship to considerations of sound jurisdictional policy.
I. THE S&P LITIGATION AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
A. Background
Before we jump into the jurisdictional weeds, a brief word is in order
about the factual background and procedural posture of these cases. The
lawsuits seek to hold S&P accountable for its role in the financial crisis that
accompanied the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United
States in 2008. The gravamen of the claims is that S&P deceived investors by
purporting to provide objective, arm’s length analysis of the riskiness of
certain structured finance securities when, in fact, its analysis was tainted by a
desire to please its clients (the very issuers whose securities S&P was rating)
and thereby increase its share of the market for the relevant analytic services.4
All the suits were filed in state court, and, in all of them, the plaintiffstates pressed state law causes of action only.5 The defendant responded by

3. Andrew Harris, S&P Ratings Lawsuits Moved to N.Y. over State Objections, Bloomberg
(June 6, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-06/s-p-ratings-lawsuits-transferred-tofederal-court-in-n-y-.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a discussion of the
benefits of litigating in your own backyard (with particular attention to the benefits of litigating in
either state or federal court), see Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the
Justifications for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 95, 132–46 (2009) [hereinafter
Seinfeld, Federal Courts].
4. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 1–3, Arizona ex rel. Horne v.
McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV2013-001188 (Ariz. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 2013). When referring to
arguments advanced by the states or by S&P, I will draw on the papers filed in the Arizona
litigation, which I have selected more or less at random (I think alphabetical order counts as
“random” for these purposes). I could just as easily have drawn from the papers filed by the state
and by S&P in any of the cases in which S&P is the defendant.
5. The precise claims vary some from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They are drawn
principally from state consumer protection and unfair trade practices laws.
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removing the actions to federal court and seeking consolidation.6 As noted at
the outset, the MDL panel granted S&P’s motion to consolidate and transferred
the cases to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The first order of business for the judge to whom the cases have been
assigned will be determining whether they should be remanded to state court.7
Existing law indicates that they should.
B. S&P’s Jurisdictional Claims
The fact that the AGs presented state law causes of action only suffices to
bring these suits outside the realm of the jurisdictionally straightforward.
Under the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, an action may be removed from
state to federal court only if the plaintiff could have filed in federal court as an
original matter.8 And under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(which S&P treats as the basis for jurisdiction in its removal petitions), a case
falls within the original jurisdiction of the federal district courts only if it
“aris[es] under” federal law.9 The question of when a suit “arises under”
federal law is governed by the venerable well-pleaded complaint rule.10 And it
is widely understood that, in the vast majority of cases at least, the rule directs
that causes of action created by federal law are eligible for federal question
jurisdiction, while causes of action created by state law are not.11 By relying
exclusively on state law, then, the attorneys general foreclosed the possibility
of removal on the basis of a vanilla application of § 1331. If the cases are
removable, it will have to be because a more exotic jurisdictional theory
applies.
1. The Grable Theory: Embedded Federal Questions. — The most likely
candidate, and the one S&P turned to explicitly in its removal papers, draws on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue

6. See, e.g., Defendants’ Notice of Removal, Horne, No. CV2013-001188 [hereinafter AZ
Notice of Removal].
7. I focus here on the arguments advanced by S&P prior to consolidation. In a move
designed, no doubt, to frustrate the author of this Essay, S&P has recently filed a brief with the
Southern District of New York (in opposition to the States’ motion to remand the consolidated
cases) in which it has shifted the emphasis of—and in some respects changed—its arguments as
to why, exactly, federal question jurisdiction exists in these cases. I briefly address these new
arguments infra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (limiting removal to actions “of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction”).
9. See id. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
10. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“[A] suit arises
under the Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff’s statement of his
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.”).
11. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (explaining
that “a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action”). But see T.B. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (“It has come to be realized that [American Well
Works’s] formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended.”).
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Engineering & Manufacturing12 and the jurisdictional tradition of which it is a
part.13 Grable confirms the existence of § 1331 jurisdiction over a narrow
class of suits in which state law supplies the plaintiff’s cause(s) of action.
Specifically, it provides that “arising under” jurisdiction will lie over a state
law claim if the claim “necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually
disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.”14
In seeking removal, S&P insisted that the state enforcement actions
“‘necessarily require resolution’” of two substantial questions of federal law.15
First, it argued that adjudicating these cases “calls for courts to make judicial
determinations concerning the scope of CRARA [the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006].”16 S&P emphasized that CRARA “include[s] a variety
of requirements related to the independence of the ratings process,”17 and it
insisted that this litigation will require courts to determine the meaning and
preemptive sweep of that statute, as well as the question of how these state law
claims fit into the mosaic of federal securities law and policy more generally.18
Second, S&P contended that its ratings constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment, and so “in each case, the court will need to decide whether the
absence of a heightened ‘fault’ requirement in [the applicable state laws]
renders them unconstitutional as applied to [S&P’s] speech.”19
These claims about the application of CRARA and the First Amendment
may or may not enable S&P to escape liability in these enforcement actions,
but they have nothing at all to do with federal jurisdiction. For while it may be
“necessary” for the courts to provide answers to these questions of federal law
in the course of adjudicating these cases, “necessity,” under the Grable
doctrine, refers to something different. It refers to scenarios in which the
plaintiff cannot make out her affirmative case without some showing as to the
meaning or application of federal law, and the preemption and First
Amendment claims at issue here do not “necessarily” arise in this particular
sense.

12. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
13. The canonical cases include Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986), Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), and American Well
Works, 241 U.S. 257.
14. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
15. AZ Notice of Removal, supra note 6, at 5 (alteration omitted) (quoting Hughes v.
Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 478 F. App’x 167, 170 (5th Cir. 2012)).
16. Id. (citing Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat.
1327).
17. Id. at 4.
18. See id. at 5 (“[A]djudicating the claims . . . calls for courts to make judicial
determinations concerning the scope of CRARA [and] the federal interests served by that
regulatory scheme in the context of broader federal regulatory oversight of national securities
markets . . . .”).
19. Id. at 6–7.
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In Grable itself, the plaintiff sought to quiet title to real property located
in the state of Michigan.20 State pleading rules directed Grable to “specify ‘the
facts establishing the superiority of [its] claim.’”21 Grable’s claim of title was
premised on the contention that the IRS failed to comply with federal laws
governing the provision of notice to property holders before effecting a seizure
to satisfy a tax delinquency.22 Thus, “specify[ing] the facts establishing the
superiority of [Grable’s] claim”23 meant proving something about the content
and application of federal law. It was not necessary to consult the defendant’s
pleadings to locate a federal issue pertinent to the litigation. This aspect of the
Grable rule—that a state law claim “necessarily” raises a federal question only
if the federal issue is somehow embedded in the plaintiff’s affirmative claim—
has been a feature of the doctrine since its inception.24
The S&P litigation is not structured this way. It is almost certainly true, as
S&P contends, that adjudicating these cases will require a determination as to
whether the enforcement actions are preempted by CRARA or forbidden by
the First Amendment. But these questions will come into play only at the
defendant’s behest, and so they cannot support federal court jurisdiction under
the Grable theory.
2. Uniformity, Interstate Coordination, and Complete Preemption. —
S&P deployed two additional lines of argument in an effort to prop up its
jurisdictional claims. First, the notices of removal emphasize the possibility
that piecemeal adjudication of the overlapping issues raised by these state
enforcement actions could yield conflicting outcomes and nonuniform
applications of federal law. “[I]t simply cannot be,” S&P insists, “that different
states across the country could have different powers in relation to the federal
regulatory scheme [at issue].”25 Perhaps not, but this sort of hand-waving
about the interest in national uniformity fails to distinguish the S&P litigation
from hordes of cases (none of them removable) in which a defendant insists

20. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310–11 (2005).
21. Id. at 314 (alteration in original) (quoting Mich. Ct. R. 3.411(B)(2)(c)).
22. Id. at 310, 314–15.
23. Id. at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Compare Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (authorizing
exercise of federal jurisdiction where plaintiff could not make out the elements of his affirmative
claim without some showing as to the content of federal law), with Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (prohibiting exercise of federal jurisdiction over state
law cause of action—despite the fact that the suit was almost certain to turn on a question of
federal law—where plaintiff’s affirmative case did not require resolution of any federal
questions). See also, e.g., Ne. Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n,
707 F.3d 883, 890 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Federal defenses to a well-pleaded complaint, such as
preemption or preclusion, do not provide a basis for removal.”); R.I. Fishermen’s Alliance, Inc. v.
R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 585 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy the [Grable] rule, the
plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint must exhibit . . . an embedded question of federal law . . . . The
existence of a federal defense to a state-law cause of action will not suffice.” (citation omitted)).
25. AZ Notice of Removal, supra note 6, at 6.
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that a state law claim is preempted by federal law.26 If the widely held
assumption that federal courts are better able than state courts to supply
uniform interpretations of federal law27 is correct, then any time state courts
are permitted to interpret federal law, there is a heightened risk of divergent
interpretations. And where the federal claim is one of preemption, the risk is
precisely that “different states” will have “different powers” in relation to some
federal regulatory scheme. Federal jurisdictional law addresses this concern
not by allowing for removal to federal court any time a preemption defense is
raised, but by authorizing the Supreme Court to review the final judgments of
state courts with respect to federal questions.28 Hence S&P’s claims about the
interest in national uniformity are ultimately a distraction. They identify a
policy consideration that is surely pertinent to sound thinking about
jurisdictional allocation in a federal system, but has no bearing on the
permissibility of removal under the prevailing law.
Second, S&P’s removal papers repeatedly draw attention to the fact that
the state enforcement actions represent a “cohesive, coordinated effort” on the
part of the state attorneys general.29 They emphasize, in this vein, that a
majority of the state enforcement actions were filed on the same day, that there
is a great deal of overlap across the various complaints (in terms of both the
factual allegations and the nature of the causes of action relied upon), and that
(at least some of) the AGs consulted one another in the course of developing
their litigation strategies.30 S&P acknowledges that “[t]his level of cooperation
[is] not inappropriate,” but insists that it “bears directly on the impact of the
cases on well-established federal interests.”31 Of course, no one doubts that
national interests are at stake here. The question is whether and how this bears
on the jurisdictional calculus, and S&P does not really explain.

26. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936) (“[A] suit brought upon a state
statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States because
prohibited thereby.”).
27. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“[W]hile perfect uniformity may not have been achieved, experience indicates that
the availability of a federal forum in federal-question cases has done much to advance that
goal.”).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006) (“Final judgments . . . rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question . . . .”);
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (“A motive of another kind . . .
might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and
even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States . . . .”). The rare
exception to the prohibition on grounding removal in the fact that the defendant has presented a
federal defense is embodied in the doctrine of complete preemption. I address the complete
preemption doctrine immediately below. See infra text accompanying notes 32–36.
29. AZ Notice of Removal, supra note 6, at 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. S&P does not specify how or why the cooperation in question “bears directly on the
impact of the cases on . . . federal interests.” Presumably, its point is that the interstate
coordination reflects the national scope of the underlying issues. And national problems with the
operation of credit rating agencies, the argument goes, are addressed by federal law.
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One possible reading of S&P’s argument is that it is a sotto voce allusion
to the doctrine of complete preemption, which (on rare occasions) allows for
the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over state law claims. Complete
preemption takes hold when a plaintiff files a state law cause of action that is
preempted by federal law, and that federal law supplies the exclusive cause of
action for the harm alleged.32 In other words, it covers scenarios in which
federal law not only preempts the plaintiff’s state law claim, but also supplies a
replacement cause of action on which the plaintiff might have relied. Under
these conditions, the Court has explained, the plaintiff’s filing constitutes an
exercise in artful pleading—an attempt to pass off what is necessarily a federal
cause of action as a state law claim.33 The complete preemption rule prevents
plaintiffs from avoiding removal through this sleight of hand. Perhaps S&P
means to intimate that something similar is afoot here—that the fifteen state
law actions are, in fact, a single, consolidated, nationwide enforcement action
masquerading as discrete lawsuits; and the plaintiffs, the argument goes, ought
not to be permitted to escape federal court jurisdiction by obscuring the true
nature of their filings.
If this is what S&P is up to in its removal papers,34 the argument goes
nowhere. To begin with, the cases do not come close to satisfying the formal
requirements of the complete preemption rule. (No doubt this explains the
defendant’s failure to rely on it explicitly.) For not only does CRARA fail to
state that federal law supplies the exclusive cause of action for conduct falling
within its ambit, the statute appears to shield enforcement actions like those at
issue here from the preemptive reach of the law.35 More generally, it is
difficult to see why the fact of close coordination among state attorneys
general means that the underlying claims are “really” federal in nature and
therefore proper candidates for removal.36 Surely state attorneys general can
32. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“When the federal statute
completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that
cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. This claim
is then removable . . . .”).
33. Id.
34. To be clear, S&P does not make explicit reference to the doctrine of complete
preemption in its removal papers. Still, its arguments were sufficiently close to invoking the
doctrine to cause most of the plaintiff-states to address complete preemption in their motions to
remand and to explain why the doctrine does not apply. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
with Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 4, Maine v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. 1:13 cv-00067JAW (D. Me. Mar. 15, 2013) (“CRARA clearly does not involve a case of complete preemption.
Indeed, provisions of CRARA make clear that the Act contemplates an active role for state law
enforcement authorities in addressing deceptive conduct.”).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o)(2) (2012) (“Nothing in this subsection prohibits the securities
commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State from investigating
and bringing an enforcement action with respect to fraud or deceit against any nationally
recognized statistical rating organization or person associated with a nationally recognized
statistical rating organization.”).
36. A parallel criticism applies to the complete preemption rule itself. See Beneficial Nat’l
Bank, 539 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he . . . fact that a state-law claim is invalid no
more deprives it of its character as a state-law claim which does not raise a federal question, than
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coordinate their filing of distinct state law claims without those claims
somehow morphing into federal claims.37 Once again, S&P’s arguments
suffice to demonstrate that the state enforcement actions are fraught with
national implications, but these arguments have little to do with the contours of
federal jurisdictional law.38
II. THE S&P LITIGATION AND JURISDICTIONAL POLICY
Our jurisdictional law forecloses consideration of two features of the S&P
litigation that seem essential to sound thinking about whether the federal courts
ought to be permitted to hear the cases. First (as we have seen already), S&P
does the fact that a federal claim is invalid deprive it of its character as a federal claim which does
raise a federal question.”).
37. Cf. id. at 18–19 (inquiring why and how a state law claim that is preempted by a federal
law that supplies the exclusive cause of action for the harm alleged “is transmogrified into the
claim of a federal right”); Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev.
537, 554 n.59 (2007) [hereinafter Seinfeld, Puzzle] (“Parties advance nonviable claims all the
time; and when they do, such claims are typically dismissed. [The Court does not explain] why
state-law claims that are not viable because they are ‘completely preempted’ are transformed into
federal claims.”).
38. As noted earlier, see supra note 7, S&P’s filing before the Southern District of New
York includes an overhaul of some of its arguments in support of federal question jurisdiction.
The hand-waving about important federal interests persists, see, e.g., Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motions to Remand at 1–2, 4, 10, In re Standard & Poor’s Rating
Agency Litig., No. 13-MD-2446 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 23, 2013), but the recent filing
shows greater sensitivity to the Grable doctrine’s requirement that federal law be brought directly
into question by the plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. at 15 (“The States’ own formulation of their
claims will necessarily and inevitably require the Court to evaluate S&P’s compliance with
federal law.”).
S&P emphasizes, in particular, that (1) credit rating agencies using the “issuer pays” model
are required by federal law to establish and enforce policies to manage conflicts of interest, and
(2) the States have alleged that S&P misled the public by claiming to have neutralized conflicts
rooted in the issuer pays model. Id. at 14. S&P then insists that a court cannot determine whether
these claims were misleading without also determining whether S&P was in compliance with
federal law. Id. at 15. S&P also notes that some of the state antifraud provisions on which the
plaintiffs rely include exemptions for conduct that is compliant with a federal regulatory scheme.
Id. at 23–24. Under these laws, S&P insists, a finding of liability is contingent on whether the
challenged conduct is consistent with federal law, and so the crucial Grable requirement is
satisfied. Id. at 24.
Both arguments appear to be red herrings. It may be that, in the course of determining
whether S&P violated state law by misleading the public, a court will learn enough to answer the
separate question whether S&P failed to meet its obligations under federal law. But that doesn’t
transform findings pertinent to the state law inquiry into determinations of questions of federal
law. Meanwhile, the notion that the conduct of which the plaintiffs in these cases complain is
authorized by, or is an exercise in compliance with, federal law seems highly dubious. If it is true
that a court would need to address this issue prior to assigning liability under the relevant state
laws, it is equally true that a court would first need to assess whether the conduct in question is
compliant with federal environmental and antitrust laws. S&P’s reading of these exemptions
seems to stretch them well beyond their breaking point. See Consolidated Reply in Support of
Plaintiff States’ Motions to Remand at 5–8, In re Standard & Poor’s Rating Agency Litig., No.
13-MD-2446 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 9, 2013) (explaining that plaintiffs’ state law claims can
succeed without the states making any showing as to the meaning or application of federal law).
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will present defenses that sound in federal law; these defenses are almost
certain to feature prominently in this litigation, and they might prove
dispositive. Second, the lawsuits in question are enforcement actions brought
by sovereign states, not private actions in which plaintiffs seek redress for
individual losses. These two factors cut in opposite directions for purposes of
jurisdictional analysis: The former militates in favor of federal court
jurisdiction, while the latter counsels against it. For purposes of this Essay,
however, I wish to focus not on the question of how best to reconcile these
competing forces, but on the fact that our jurisdictional law ignores them
entirely.
A. Federal Question, Federal Court
The irrelevance of S&P’s federal defenses is attributable, as we have seen,
to the well-pleaded complaint rule—which excludes pleadings other than the
complaint from the jurisdictional calculus—and the removal statute—which
doubles down on the well-pleaded complaint rule by tethering the
permissibility of removal to the scope of original federal jurisdiction.39
Scholars have long criticized these features of our jurisdictional law and
lamented the myopic character of the jurisdictional regime they help
constitute.40 The grounds for objection are clear and compelling. If we proceed
from the conventional premise that federal judges are more apt than their state
court counterparts to provide uniform, expert interpretations of federal law,41
then we have cause to wonder why eligibility for federal jurisdiction ought to
turn on whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who raises a federal
question. As one prominent commentary explains, “The dangers against which
[federal question] jurisdiction guards are as likely to be met when federal law
is relied on defensively as when it is relied on offensively.”42
The S&P litigation provides more grist for this mill. A cause of action
established by our federal securities laws and filed against S&P or against the
issuers of mortgage-backed securities would undoubtedly support jurisdiction

39. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts 187–91 (1969) [hereinafter ALI Study] (advocating federal defense removal);
James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 639, 665 (1942) (arguing that federal courts ought to be permitted to exercise jurisdiction on
the basis of anticipated federal defenses and that, if it becomes clear in the course of litigation that
no such defense will materialize, dismissal or remand is appropriate); Donald L. Doernberg,
There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages
the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 658–59 (1987) (advocating
abandonment of well-pleaded complaint rule and authorization of removal on the basis of a
federal defense).
41. See ALI Study, supra note 40, at 164–68 (arguing that federal courts are better equipped
to interpret federal law than state courts). But see Seinfeld, Federal Courts, supra note 3, at 114–
32 (advancing reasons to be skeptical of the view that federal courts are equipped to supply
uniform, expert interpretation of federal law).
42. ALI Study, supra note 40, at 189.
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under the federal question statute.43 And yet a state law cause of action that
triggers a defense predicated on the very same laws would not.
There are reasons the law of federal question jurisdiction is structured this
way. If jurisdiction were to lie on the basis of a plaintiff’s speculation that the
defendant might raise a federal defense, it could lead to the federalization of
cases in which no issue of federal law actually materializes.44 And even if we
extended federal jurisdiction only to those cases in which the defendant
actually raises a federal defense, those tribunals would quickly face a caseload
burden that they could not hope to manage.45 But it is not as if these
difficulties cannot be mitigated. One might avoid the former problem by
continuing the practice of prohibiting the assertion of federal question
jurisdiction on the basis of anticipated federal questions46 and allowing for
federal defense removal only once it is clear from the defendant’s pleadings
that a federal defense has been raised.47 The docket-control problem,
meanwhile, might be alleviated by restricting federal defense removal to
scenarios in which federal law is potentially dispositive of the entire action or
by including an amount in controversy requirement in the removal statute.48 Of
43. See, e.g., Boca Raton Firefighters & Police Pension Fund v. Bahash, 506 F. App’x 32,
39 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, of claims brought under securities laws by private parties against S&P’s parent
company and not questioning the existence of federal court jurisdiction).
44. Justice William Johnson raised this concern in the course of rejecting the expansive
conception of federal jurisdiction endorsed by the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). “It is true,” he wrote, “that a question might be made, upon the
effect of [federal law], on the rights claimed [in some case]; but until that question does arise . . .
what end has the United States to subserve in claiming jurisdiction of the cause?” Id. at 885
(Johnson, J., dissenting). Justice Johnson explained further:
The object [of the constitutional and statutory provision governing federal court
jurisdiction] was, to secure a uniform construction and a steady execution of the laws
of the Union. Except as far as this purpose might require, the general government had
no interest in stripping the State Courts of their jurisdiction . . . . Why then should
[they] be vested with jurisdiction in a thousand causes, on a mere possibility of a
question arising, which question, at last, does not occur in one of them?
Id. at 886.
45. See, e.g., Seinfeld, Puzzle, supra note 37, at 545–46.
46. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“It is not enough
that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that the
defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution . . . . [S]uch allegations . . . do not
show that the suit, that is, the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution.”).
47. This approach carries the downside, relative to established practice, of delaying a
conclusive determination with respect to jurisdiction. It is desirable to settle jurisdictional issues
at an early stage, since it is wasteful for a court to invest significant time and energy into a case
only to determine that jurisdiction is ultimately lacking. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Artful
Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1781, 1782–83 (1998) (noting that
the well-pleaded complaint rule requires plaintiffs to establish the existence of federal question in
the complaint, and that this helps conserve federal judiciary’s limited resources). This difficulty
might be addressed by accelerating the timeline for defendants to announce whether they intend
to rely on federal law as part of their defense.
48. The American Law Institute suggested both of these things in its 1969 report on the
allocation of cases between state and federal court. See ALI Study, supra note 40, at 25
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course, these limitations carve out of the jurisdiction of the federal courts cases
in which questions of federal law might feature prominently. And in this way,
the carve-outs mirror the well-pleaded complaint rule insofar as they are
disconnected from first principles of federal question jurisdiction. But this
approach would still qualify as a significant improvement over the
jurisdictional status quo, which (complete preemption to one side) treats
federal defenses as categorically irrelevant.49
B. State Enforcement Action, State Court
The fact that the S&P litigation comprises a series of enforcement actions
brought by the states to redress public harms adds an additional wrinkle to the
jurisdictional analysis. For even if it is the case that federal defense removal
ought sometimes to be permitted, and even if the S&P litigation is, in some
respects, a particularly strong candidate for removal on the basis of a federal
defense, the fact that these suits are sovereign enforcement actions militates
against allowing them to proceed in federal court.
Although the removal of a state-initiated action to enforce state law is not
unheard of,50 it is very much the exception and not the rule. Our jurisdictional
traditions suggest, instead, that proper respect for the sovereign authority of the
states requires that they be permitted to enforce their law in their own courts.51
(suggesting permitting removal “[i]f the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000” and if, “subsequent to the initial pleading, a substantial [federal] defense is properly
asserted that . . . would be dispositive of the action or of all counterclaims therein”). It is likely
that such a rule would encourage defendants eager to remove to federal court to cast about for
some federal defense that might suffice to support removal, even if that defense is exceedingly
unlikely to succeed. At least one commentator has defended the well-pleaded complaint rule on
the ground that it is considerably easier for defendants to conjure flimsy federal defenses than it is
for plaintiffs to find plausibly applicable affirmative causes of action that sound in federal law.
See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 190 (1985). One way to attack this
problem would be to have judges make discretionary judgments as to whether a federal defense is
sufficiently serious to support removal, though it must be acknowledged that this would render
jurisdictional practice considerably more uncertain.
49. To be clear, the docket-control consequences of such a shift would be dramatic. If this
sort of move is to be endorsed without either seriously overtaxing the federal judiciary or
significantly increasing the number of federal judges, it will be necessary to rethink other
elements of the law of federal jurisdiction. The significant curtailment of diversity jurisdiction is
the obvious move. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (lamenting “the mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial
system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction”). But see Diane P. Wood, The
Changing Face of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 Temp. L. Rev. 593, 605 (2009) (defending targeted
use of diversity jurisdiction as a means of “assuring a national approach to national problems that
happen to be governed by state law”). This Essay is not the place for sustained engagement with
the question of whether diversity jurisdiction ought to be abolished.
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (Supp. V 2012) (authorizing removal of criminal or civil
actions commenced against federal officers for, or relating to, their official acts).
51. The ALI study, which endorses federal defense removal, carves out an exception for
actions brought by the states. See ALI Study, supra note 40, at 26. It also explains that “[a]s a
matter of policy, . . . proper respect for the states suggests that they should be allowed to use their
own courts for routine matters of law enforcement.” Id. at 201.
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This is reflected most prominently (which is not to say uncontroversially) in
the line of Supreme Court decisions directing federal courts to abstain from
adjudicating federal claims properly within their jurisdiction so that ongoing
state court proceedings (in which those claims might be ventilated) can run
their course.52 If the law prohibits private parties from using affirmative suits
for injunctive relief to call a halt to state enforcement actions, it is difficult to
see why (absent extraordinary circumstances)53 it should permit parties to do
so through the device of removal.
Here too, the law of federal question jurisdiction simply fails to engage. It
turns out that the well-pleaded complaint rule is well adapted to keeping state
enforcement actions out of the federal system, but this has nothing at all to do
with the nuances of our federalism as applied to such cases. It is a byproduct of
the docket-control (and related) considerations mentioned earlier. And since
the law governing federal question jurisdiction fails to treat the presence of a
federal defense as sufficient, on its own, to underwrite federal judicial
authority, it has nothing to tell us about how best to strike the balance between
the interests in federal court adjudication of federal questions and state court
control over the enforcement of state law.
CONCLUSION
When the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the
consolidation of fifteen sovereign enforcement actions against S&P, at least
one observer speculated that this might portend success for S&P in its efforts
to keep the cases in federal court. “If I was a state, with a motion for remand
pending,” opined this commentator, “I’d be concerned that the reasons given
for consolidating these actions before one judge could have an influence on the
remand decision of that judge.”54 S&P, of course, is hoping this proves correct,
as it is now fighting remand motions that have been presented to the judge
presiding over the consolidated actions. But this is almost certainly a losing
battle, for under existing law, the arguments in favor of federal question
jurisdiction are seriously flawed.
What is most noteworthy about the jurisdictional questions in these cases,
however, is not that S&P’s arguments are unavailing, but that the law directs
our attention away from the features of this litigation that would seem most
pertinent to sound thinking about whether the federal courts ought to intervene.
Neither the fact that federal questions are certain to feature prominently, nor
the fact that the suits in question are sovereign enforcement actions, will have
bearing on the court’s assessment of whether federal question jurisdiction will
lie. In this way, the S&P litigation exemplifies some of the most unsatisfying
features of our system for allocating cases between the state and federal courts.
52. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49–54 (1971); see also Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592, 603–07 (1975) (applying Younger doctrine to civil enforcement action).
53. See supra note 50 (describing limited circumstances where removal is allowed).
54. See Harris, supra note 3 (quoting Kenneth A. Wexler, class action plaintiffs’ lawyer
unaffiliated with S&P litigation) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Reasonable people can disagree as to whether, all things considered, the S&P
litigation belongs in one system or the other, but it is not too much to ask that
our efforts to resolve this question be more sensitive to considerations of sound
jurisdictional policy.
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